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Given his view’s need of teleology, the independent plausibility of his
view in its own right, and independent reasons for rejecting the causal
closure principle, he sees no compelling reason to reject all teleological
explanation. Indeed, he sees naturalism, not science, as the primary motivator for rejecting purposeful explanation (here, he incorporates material
from his co-authored book with Charles Taliaferro, Naturalism (Eerdmans,
2008)). The purpose that his perfect happiness account requires (at both
personal and cosmic levels) is threatened, not by science, but by a questionable naturalism, so he argues.
Finally, in chapter 5 he concludes by bringing his perfect happiness
view of life’s meaning into conversation with important issues at the fore
in discussions over the problem of evil and eschatology. Along the way
he interacts with strategies enlisted by some theistic philosophers to neutralize the problem of evil, most notably skeptical theism. He even develops his own theodicy, incorporating the idea of perfect happiness. This is
surely a place where Goetz’s book gestures both directly and indirectly to
the need for increased theoretical development—questions at the intersection of the meaning of life and the problem of evil in general, the meaning
of life and skeptical theism in particular, and the connection between ending, death, and life’s meaning.
The Purpose of Life: A Theistic Perspective makes an important contribution to the growing discussion within analytic philosophy over life’s meaning. Goetz covers a lot of interesting philosophical territory to make his
case—value theory, naturalism, reductionism, the problem of evil, even
heaven and hell. His choice of interlocutors is equally as interesting: St.
Augustine, Bertrand Russell, C. S. Lewis, Daniel Dennett, Thomas Nagel
and Alvin Plantinga to name a few. Those interested in a monographlength discussion of life’s meaning from a theistic perspective will want to
read this book. I hope that Goetz’s contribution motivates others to work
further (or for the first time) in this area.

Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature
Is Almost Certainly False, by Thomas Nagel. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2012. x + 130 pages. $24.95 cloth.
WILLIAM JAWORSKI, Fordham University
Thomas Nagel argues in his most recent book that the materialist worldview which has come to dominate academic philosophy and the nonacademic philosophizing of many scientists cannot provide an adequate
explanation of life’s origins. As a result, Nagel proposes that we consider
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seriously an alternative account—not the theistic one favored by intelligent design theorists, but one inspired by Aristotle’s philosophy and its
central notion of natural teleology.
Teleological explanations attribute end-directedness to things. The most
familiar teleological explanations are intentional ones, but non-intentional
teleological explanations are common in biology. Plants, for instance,
grow leaves in order to capture energy from the sun. Presumably things
like plants do not form intentions, so their end-directedness must be due
to something else. In the ancient world, Plato suggested it was due to an
external intentional source, an intelligent being who assigned functions
to natural things the way people assign functions to artifacts. Aristotle
disagreed. Natural teleology was not derivative and external, but basic
and internal. Some things simply have innate tendencies to grow, develop,
and behave in end-directed ways. Aristotle’s understanding of teleology
was shelved after the Scientific Revolution, but Plato’s found modern
sympathizers in William Paley and contemporary intelligent design theorists. Many people still consider it to be the only alternative to materialist
accounts which either eliminate teleology or reduce it to something else.
Nagel argues that these alternatives fail.
According to Nagel, materialist theories lack the resources to explain
the emergence of life. The reason is that they lack the resources to explain
the emergence of consciousness, reason, and value. Adequate explanations must imply that the phenomena they explain are not mere chance
occurrences but expected outcomes. Since consciousness, reason, and
value are the most recent outcomes of the same process responsible for the
emergence of basic biological phenomena, any adequate explanation of
the latter must imply that consciousness, reason, and value were expected
outcomes of the same process. Nagel claims that materialist theories are
incapable of providing explanations of this sort; consequently, they fail to
provide an adequate explanation for the basic emergence of life. We thus
need an alternative. The one offered by theists is unacceptable both because it is incompatible with Nagel’s atheism and because by locating the
intelligibility of the natural world in something outside that world, it fails
to provide the kind of unified understanding that philosophy hopes to
achieve. That leaves natural teleology: there is in the fabric of the cosmos
a (non-intentional) predisposition to produce value, reason, consciousness, and life. Such a predisposition provides the additional conceptual
resources needed to understand the emergence of life and mind.
Mind and Cosmos is independent-minded, thought-provoking, and relatively short. Nagel avoids technical jargon, although he tends to use terms
like “materialism” in proprietary ways that can make it difficult to map
his ideas onto familiar debates. I also have some reservations about his
arguments.
First, we’ve seen that according to Nagel a successful explanation
of life depends on a successful explanation of consciousness, reason,
and value. At times I found the rationale for this premise difficult to
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appreciate. Consider Nagel’s criticism of panprotopsychism. Panprotopsychism claims that the basic elements of the universe have both physical and proto-mental properties. Nagel claims that in order to explain the
emergence of life, panprotopsychists have to assign a central role to the
proto-mental properties of the elements. But why can’t panprotopsychists
endorse a two-stage explanation: physical properties explain the origins
of basic biological processes, and proto-mental properties are powers that
remain latent until basic biological processes first appear, at which point
they become active and operate to bring about consciousness? By analogy, think of two-stage devices like a hydrogen bomb, which has fission
and fusion stages. The detonation of a fissile core creates temperatures
hot enough to trigger the detonation of a fusile core. Couldn’t the physical properties of the elements create conditions that subsequently trigger
the activation of latent proto-mental properties? In that case, the account
of life’s origins, the biological processes that at a bare minimum qualify
something as living, would not have to appeal to proto-mental properties;
those properties would have to be invoked only to explain how something
that qualified as living also qualified as conscious.
Nagel does suggest a response. He argues that because mental properties and behavior are “internally connected” in the lives of macroscopic
organisms, proto-mental properties and proto-behavioral physical properties would have to be internally connected in a similar way at the level
of their microscopic parts. Proto-mental properties would thus have to
have physical implications at the microscopic level just as full-blown mental properties do at the macroscopic level. Yet even if there are internal
connections between proto-mental and physical properties, as Nagel proposes, it is still not evident why physical properties could not be sufficient
by themselves to explain the basic emergence of life, for this hypothesis
is compatible both with physical properties necessitating the activation of
proto-mental properties and with physical properties being necessitated
by them. It thus seems possible either that proto-mental properties could
factor into an explanation of basic biological processes indirectly in the
sense of explaining the physical conditions that were directly responsible
for the emergence of those processes, or else that they could play no role
in explaining the emergence of basic biological processes at all, as I suggested above, but only a role in explaining consciousness. I am not sure
Nagel says anything that rules out this kind of view, but in that case, it is no
longer clear that a successful materialist explanation of life must depend
on a successful materialist explanation of consciousness, as he insists.
Nagel’s argument that materialism cannot explain the emergence of
reason faces a similar problem:
[S]uppose I observe a contradiction among my beliefs and “see” that I must
give up at least one of them. . . . It is not adequate to say that . . . I feel the
urgent need to alter my beliefs to escape [contradiction], which is explained
by the fact that avoiding contradictions, like avoiding snakes and precipices,
was fitness-enhancing for my ancestors. (82–83)
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An alternative picture of reason takes the ability to recognize and respond
to contradictions to be the result of training and habituation. Not only
would this explain why some people apparently feel no compulsion to reject either of a pair of contradictory beliefs, it would also mesh with what
most of us know about practical affairs; namely, people sometimes think
and act in contradictory ways. If responsiveness to reasons is a learned
behavior, then an explanation of it will not appeal directly to natural selection as Nagel suggests; it will appeal instead to learning. In that case,
however, it is possible to endorse a multi-stage explanation for rational
capacities that separates the task of explaining reason’s emergence from
the task of explaining life’s emergence. Natural selection explains our ability to learn, learning explains our ability to recognize and respond to reasons, and both factors are separate from the physico-chemical occurrences
that explain the basic emergence of life. Nagel says nothing to rule out an
account of reason like this, so it is once again unclear why a successful
materialist explanation of life depends on a successful materialist explanation of mind.
Third, Nagel’s argument that materialism cannot explain the emergence of value relies heavily on Sharon Street’s argument that moral realism and natural selection are incompatible. The argument’s key premise
is that a capacity to discern moral truth would contribute nothing to
reproductive fitness beyond what a capacity merely to act as if there is
moral truth would contribute. By analogy someone might argue that an
organism does not actually have to perceive environmental threats to act
in ways that contribute to its reproductive fitness; it is enough for it to act
as if it perceives a threat since false positives may be as effective promoting survival and reproduction as true positives. But there are surely limits
to this reasoning. Something must explain how a capacity that generates
false positives could manage to contribute to reproductive fitness, and in
many cases the explanation will be that the same capacity also produces
true positives. In the perceptual case, a disposition to act as if there are
environmental threats contributes to reproductive fitness because sometimes there really are environmental threats. But then parity of reasoning
suggests that a disposition to act as if there are moral truths contributes to
reproductive fitness because sometimes there really are moral truths. To
illustrate this point consider Nagel’s example of pain:
the real badness of pain and the ability to recognize that badness are completely superfluous in a Darwinian explanation of our aversion to pain. The
aversion to pain enhances fitness solely in virtue of the fact that it leads us
to avoid the injury associated with pain, not in virtue of the fact that pain is
really bad. (108–109)

Suppose, however, that pain is not bad in itself, but that it is good for organisms like us to be capable of experiencing pain since pain enables us to
avoid things that really are bad for us. A disposition to act as if something
is harmful contributes to reproductive fitness because sometimes things
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really are harmful. On this view, which Nagel doesn’t address, the real
goodness of pain-capability and the real badness of harmful environmental factors are not completely superfluous to a Darwinian explanation of
our aversion to pain.
Finally, even though Aristotle is Nagel’s touchstone for natural teleology, the view of teleology Nagel favors has a residual Platonic element.
Like Plato, Nagel sees teleology as a cosmic tendency; the universe is
almost like a giant organism that tends to behave in ways that produce
life and mind. I’m not sure a contemporary Aristotelian would or should
agree. Aristotle claimed that teleology could be found everywhere in the
natural world not because the universe as a whole had innate teleological
tendencies, but because the things that exist in the universe acted individually in end-directed ways. Organisms on the Aristotelian view are
localized pockets of order and end-directedness within a cosmos that a
contemporary Aristotelian needn’t take to have any overarching teleological tendencies of its own. Unlike Aristotle, we are convinced that the
universe had a beginning, that living things did not always exist, and that
what kinds of living things there are can change over time. But contemporary Aristotelians can accommodate these ideas without turning the cosmos as a whole into something like a giant organism. This suggests a view
that has a place for teleology, but that meshes with a Darwinian account
of natural selection more easily than the cosmic teleology Nagel proposes.

